

Favocado: Fuzzing the Binding Code of JavaScript Engines Using Semantically Correct Test Cases

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NDSS 2021

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March 16, 2022

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JavaScript and its fuzzing


- JavaScript (JS) is a dynamic language interpreted by JS engines
 - e.g., Chrome V8, SpiderMonkey, Chakra, etc.
- The use of JS has expanded into the entire computing ecosystem
 - Adobe Acrobat utilizes JS engines to provide dynamic or interactive content through JS code embedded in PDF documents
- It is difficult to effectively fuzz JS engines because of the language's **syntactical** correctness
 - JS engines parse user input code into an abstract syntax tree (AST) and then process the tree
 - User inputs that cannot be transformed into an AST are easily rejected before being processed
- Existing fuzzers use context-free grammars or existing correct test cases

JavaScript and its fuzzing

- It is also important to generate semantically correct JS codes
- Many JS statements have interdependent relationships
 - Correct use of method names, argument types, and return types
 - e.g., not using after free
- Most JS fuzzers cannot generate fully semantically correct test cases
 - Some fuzzers generates semantic-aware test cases, but the percentage of rejected test cases is a significant problem
 - E.g., CodeAlchemist
- The problem becomes more severe in *JS binding layers*

JavaScript binding layer

- JS engines provide a binding layer to provide functionality implemented in unsafe languages such as C and C++
- JS cannot be used to directly implement low-level functionalities and those are implemented in native code
 - e.g., memory management and file access
- JS binding code translates data representation
 - It creates and maps data types between JS and native code
 - Then, JS scripts can call native functions or control data of native components
 - e.g., DOM object
 - During the translation, type- and memory-safety features cannot be implemented



Challenges to fuzz JS binding layer (1)

- It is practically impossible to generate legitimate JS test cases
- Fuzzers need to input many JavaScript statements as a basic testing unit
→ A semantically incorrect test case has to stop executing and retire
- Typical JS test cases that trigger the execution of binding code *once* raise the excessive number of JavaScript exceptions
 - It involves two steps (i) creating the object and (ii) setting a property or calling a function
- To fuzz the binding layers, a fuzzer should generate ***syntactically and semantically correct*** test cases to eliminate runtime exceptions

Challenges to fuzz JS binding layer (2)

- The input space is enormous
- There are many object types that are accessible through the binding layer as a DOM
 - Each DOM object may have a multitude of methods and properties
- Creating all objects to enumerate all properties and manipulate all methods is simply infeasible
- An effective fuzzer should be able to optimize the test case generation by ***reducing the size of the input space***


Favocado approach

- Favocado is a new fuzzing approach to find vulnerabilities in the binding layers of JS engines
- Generating legitimate test cases
 - Favocado parses semantic information from the Interface Definition Language (IDL) files or API references to obtain semantic information
 - Such as exact types and possible values of binding objects
 - Favocado uses the information to complete a fuzzed statement and prevents unexpected runtime errors
- Reducing input spaces

Favocado approach

- Favocado is a new fuzzing approach to find vulnerabilities in the binding layers of JS engines
 - Generating legitimate test cases
 - Reducing input spaces
 - One unique feature of the JavaScript binding layer is the relative isolation of different DOM objects
 - Different DOM objects are implemented as separate native modules unless an object in a module can be used by code in another module
 - E.g., `spell.check()` in Adobe Acrobat's `spell` module and `Net.HTTP.request()` in its `Net.HTTP` module
- | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|
| <code>spell.check()</code> | <code>=</code> | <code>Net.HTTP.request()</code> |
| <code>Net.HTTP.request()</code> | | <code>spell.check()</code> |
- Based on the relations between objects, the entire input space is divided into equivalence classes
 - Favocado only mutate within each equivalence class

Favocado overview



Semantic information construction

Dynamic test case generator

Semantic information construction

- Favocado extracts
- (1) Binding object names
 - A name of each object and a name of a parent
- (2) Binding object methods
 - Each method's name and all arguments' types
 - Checks whether a method can raise an exception
- (3) Binding object properties
 - A name, type, and possible string values of each property
 - Checks whether a property is read-only

```
1 Binding_objects["HTMLDialogElement"] = {
2   "properties":
3   {
4     "open":
5     {
6       "read_only":"None", "type":"boolean"
7     },
8     "returnValue":
9     {
10      "read_only":"None", "type":"DOMString"
11    }
12  },
13  "methods":
14  {
15    "close":
16    {
17      "exception":0, "numarg":1,
18      "args":{"arg0":"DOMString"},
19    },
20    "showModal":
21    {
22      "exception":1, "numarg":0,
23      "args":{},
24    },
25    "show":
26    {
27      "exception":0, "numarg":0,
28      "args":{},
29    }
30  },
31  "has_parent":1,
32  "p_type": "HTMLElement"
33 }
```

Semantic information construction

- Favocado finds binding objects related each other using semantic information

```
1 "ImageCapture":  
2 [{  
3   "Blob", "ImageBitmap", "MediaStreamTrack", "  
   PhotoCapabilities"  
4 }]  
5  
6 "Crypto":  
7 [{  
8   "ArrayBufferView", "SubtleCrypto"  
9 }]
```

Listing 3: An example of related objects discovered by Favocado.

- By the relation between objects, the entire input spaces can be divided into equivalence classes

Test case generator

- Test case generator (fuzz.js) dynamically generates and executes JS statements inside a target JS engine
- It includes the semantic information, context information, statement formats, and pre-defined JS statements,
- Context information: a list of *allocated* variable names with their types
 - The generator maintains the context information to prevent unexpected runtime errors
 - E.g., reference and type errors

- Statement formats


Statement formats	
1	var obj = new obj(args)
2	obj.prop = value
3	var variable = obj.method_with_return(args)
4	obj.method_without_return(args)
5	for(var i=1; i++; i<n) { statements }
6	array[index] = value
7	obj.__proto__ = obj;
8	obj.__defineSetter__(prop, func)
9	obj.__defineGetter__(prop, func)
10	obj.prototype.method()
11	function(args) { statements }

Test case generator

- Test case generator (fuzz.js) dynamically generates and executes JS statements inside a target JS engine
- It includes the semantic information, context information, statement formats, and pre-defined JS statements,
- Pre-defined JS statements
 - To manually initialize some binding objects that cannot be initialized automatically
 - Usually, binding objects that require environment-specific data such as IP address or image files

Test case generator

```
1 Initialize all objects
2 while (1) {
3     Select a statement format
4     Complete the selected format
5     Log the complete statement
6     try {
7         Execute the statement
8     } catch (error) {
9         Continue the loop
10    }
11 }
```



- For setup, Favocado randomly selects a set of targeted binding objects
 - The related objects also should be selected
- Firstly, it initializes all objects that are going to be fuzzed via predefined statements
- It randomly selects a statement format
- Then, it completes the format using the semantic information and the context information

Test case generator


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9         Continue the loop
10    }
11 }
```

fuzz.js

- For setup, binding objects
- The relationship


- Firstly, it is via predefined

- It randomly
- Then, it combines information



Test case generator

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Evaluation

- **Q1. Are existing JavaScript engine fuzzers sufficient to fuzz JavaScript binding code?**
- **Q2. Can Favocado discover new vulnerabilities in real-world JavaScript runtime systems?**
- Q3. Can Favocado be applied to fuzzing different types of binding code in JavaScript runtime systems?
- Q4. How does Favocado compare to state-of-the-art JavaScript fuzzers that can fuzz binding code?

Experiment setup


- Implementation
 - An IDL parser based on a chromium parser and API parsers for parsing PDF readers
- System and parameter setup
 - 8 VMs: 2 cores and 4GB of memory for each VM
 - Set to select less than 6 object
- Targeted JS runtimes (recent versions are used)
 - PDF readers: Adobe Acrobat Reader and Foxit PDF Reader
 - Chromium (Mojo and DOM) and WebKit (DOM)
- Counting distinct bugs: to prevent overcounting, the authors manually analyzed all crashes
 - Counted if an instruction pointer address (where a crash occurred) was different from the others and a unique series of minimized JavaScript statements caused a crash

Suitability of Favocado

- CodeAlchemist is a state-of-the-art JavaScript engine fuzzer that focuses on generating valid test cases
- How many semantically correct test cases can be generated shows the suitability as a binding code fuzzer
- Among 100K test cases, 28% were valid without causing a runtime error but could not make a crash
 - From 8,647 seed files, 100K test cases were generated

Success Rate	Fail Rate	Breakdown of Runtime Errors		
		Syntax Error	Reference Error	Type Error
28.24%	71.76%	1.76%	34.80%	63.44%

CodeAlchemist



	Success Rate	Fail Rate	Breakdown of Runtime Errors		
			Syntax Error	Ref. Error	Type Error
Chromium	90.92%	9.08%	6.55%	18.97%	74.48%
WebKit	90.75%	9.25%	6.31%	21.81%	71.87%

Favocado

Distinct bugs found by Favocado

- Adobe Acrobat Reader
 - 39 bugs within just 2 weeks
- Foxit Reader
 - 3 use-after-free vulnerabilities
- Chromium
 - For DOM binding objects, 6 bugs including 2 vulnerabilities within 2 weeks
 - For Mojo binding objects, 2 bugs including one vulnerability within 1 week
- WebKit
 - 3 bugs for 4 days

No.	Target JavaScript Runtime System	Type	Exploitable	Impact	Status
1	Adobe Acrobat Reader v2019.012.20040	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2019-8211
2	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2019-8212
3	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2019-8213
4	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2019-8214
5	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2019-8215
6	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2019-8220
7	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2019-16448
8	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2020-3792
9	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	Reported
10	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Untrusted pointer dereference	✓	High	CVE-2019-16446
11	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Heap out-of-bound write	✓	High	CVE-2020-9594
12	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Heap out-of-bound read	✓	Moderate	Reported
13	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Uninitialized heap memory use	✓	Moderate	Reported
14	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Uninitialized heap memory use	✓	Moderate	Reported
15	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Uninitialized heap memory use	✓	Moderate	Reported
16	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Type confusion	✓	High	CVE-2019-8221
17	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Type confusion	✓	High	*Fixed
18	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Type confusion	✓	High	*Fixed
19	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
...	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
39	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
40	Adobe Acrobat Reader v2020.009.20067	Use-after-free	✓	High	CVE-2020-9722
41	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	Reported
42	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Heap overflow	✓	High	Reported
43	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Heap out-of-bound read	✓	Moderate	Reported
44	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Uninitialized heap memory use	✓	Moderate	Reported
45	Adobe Acrobat Reader	Null pointer dereference	✓	Moderate	Reported
46	Foxit Reader v9.5	Use-after-free	✓	High	Reported
47	Foxit Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	Reported
48	Foxit Reader	Use-after-free	✓	High	Reported
49	Chromium (Mojo) v84.0.4110.0	Use-after-free	✓	High	Reported
50	Chromium (Mojo)	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
51	Chromium (DOM) v84.0.4110.0	Heap overflow	✓	High	CVE-2020-6524
52	Chromium (DOM)	Security check fail	✓	Moderate	Reported
53	Chromium (DOM)	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
...	Chromium (DOM)	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
56	Chromium (DOM)	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
57	WebKit v2.28	Use-after-free	✓	High	Reported
58	WebKit	Heap out-of-bound Write	✓	High	Reported
59	WebKit	Heap out-of-bound Read	✓	Moderate	Reported
60	WebKit	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported
61	WebKit	Null pointer dereference	✗	Low	Reported

*Fixed = The vendor silently fixed a bug after we reported it.

Case study: Chromium

- Mojo is a platform-agnostic library that enables Inter Process Communication (IPC) between processes implemented in multiple programming languages

```
1 smsRcv_A = new blink.mojom.SmsReceiverPtr();  
2 Mojo.bindInterface(blink.mojom.SmsReceiver.name,  
    mojo.makeRequest(smsRcv_A).handle);  
3  
4 smsRcv_B = new blink.mojom.SmsReceiverPtr();  
5 Mojo.bindInterface(blink.mojom.SmsReceiver.name,  
    mojo.makeRequest(smsRcv_B).handle);  
6  
7 smsRcv_A.receive();
```

Minimized JavaScript snippet for triggering a use- after-free vulnerability on Chromium

Resulted in deallocation of the smsRcv_A

Conclusion

- The paper proposes Favocado, a novel fuzzer for JavaScript binding code
- It can generate semantically correct test cases by using semantic information extracted from IDL files or API references
- It also dynamically handles runtime exceptions using the context information
- The evaluation shows its effectiveness by finding 61 vulnerabilities in 4 different JS runtimes