

RETHINKING THE SECURITY THREATS OF STALE* DNS GLUE RECORDS

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DISTINGUISHED PAPER AWARD

USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2024 (AUGUST 14-16, 2024)



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2024. 09. 10



NS Records of kaist.ac.kr @ns.kaist.ac.kr


```
→ ~ dig @ns.kaist.ac.kr kaist.ac.kr NS

; <<>> DiG 9.10.6 <<>> @ns.kaist.ac.kr kaist.ac.kr NS
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 32630
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 4, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags;; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;kaist.ac.kr.                IN      NS

;; ANSWER SECTION:
kaist.ac.kr.                7200    IN      NS      dns180.kaist.ac.kr.
kaist.ac.kr.                7200    IN      NS      ns.kaist.ac.kr.
kaist.ac.kr.                7200    IN      NS      dns181.kaist.ac.kr.
kaist.ac.kr.                7200    IN      NS      ns1.kaist.ac.kr.

;; Query time: 28 msec
;; SERVER: 143.248.1.177#53(143.248.1.177)
;; WHEN: Wed Sep 04 21:31:48 KST 2024
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 117
```



NS Records of kaist.ac.kr @KR ccTLD [Parent Zone]

```
➔ ~ dig @c.dns.kr kaist.ac.kr NS +norecurse

; <>> DiG 9.10.6 <>> @c.dns.kr kaist.ac.kr NS +norecurse
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 13642
;; flags: qr; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 3

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;kaist.ac.kr.                IN      NS


;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
kaist.ac.kr.                 86400   IN      NS      ns.kaist.ac.kr.
kaist.ac.kr.                 86400   IN      NS      ns1.kaist.ac.kr.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns1.kaist.ac.kr.            86400   IN      A        143.248.2.177
ns.kaist.ac.kr.             86400   IN      A        143.248.1.177

;; Query time: 6 msec
;; SERVER: 210.101.61.1#53(210.101.61.1)
;; WHEN: Wed Sep 04 21:31:27 KST 2024
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 107
```


Referral response

➔ Glue records



Background – Glue Records

- Specific **A records** of delegated nameservers in the DNS zone
 - Prevents resolution loop in “in-domain delegation” or “in-bailiwick”
 - RFC states that glue records are only used as part of a referral response
- Domain owners may configure their glue records via web interface



Switch to one page view ⓘ

Domain Settings | DNS Settings | Email | Tools | Integrations

easydnsdomain.net ⓘ

DNS Pro with .NET Registration | Status: Active

Domain Information | [info](#) | [nameservers](#) | [glue](#) | [whols](#) | [usage](#)

Domain Management | [move](#) | [expire](#) | [delete](#) | [backups](#) | [clone](#) | [add-ons](#)

Service Management | [upgrade](#) | [downgrade](#) | [renew](#)

Domain Security | [domain lock](#) | [get auth code](#)

Domain Portfolio | [not assigned](#) | [set](#)

domain administration

Manage Domains | [add domain](#)


Active Portfolio | [all](#)

all domains (showing 1 out of 1 total)

easydnsdomain.net | [dns](#) | [email](#) | [nameservers](#) | [whols](#) | [manage](#)

[Active](#) | [DNS Pro](#) | [GeoDNS](#) | [Registration](#)

figuration of glue records



Create a new glue record.

Click [next](#) to continue.

glue record

Nameserver name: (use the full hostname)

IPv4:

IPv6:

Note: If necessary, an A and/or AAAA record will be automatically created

[CANCEL](#) [NEXT](#)

Background – Domain Delegations (1)


- “In-bailiwick” or “In-domain” delegation

;;NS RR

ab.ca. NS ns.ab.ca


;;Glue records in .ca zone

ns.ab.ca A 9.5.6.6



Glue Records Prevents Resolution Loop

- Assume no glue record,
i.e. A record of ns.example.com
- 1. The recursive resolver queries the
.com TLD for example.com
- 2. .com TLD gives the referral response
where it tells the NS record of
example.com is ns.example.com
- 3. The recursive resolver now needs to
resolve ns.example.com which is a
subdomain of example.com
- 4. The recursive resolver queries the
.com TLD for example.com
- ➔ Loop



Background – Domain Delegations (2)


- “Out-of-bailiwick” → “Sibling-domain” delegation

;;NS RR

ab.ca. NS ns.on.ca

;;Glue records in .ca zone

ns.on.ca A 9.8.4.1




Background – Domain Delegations (3)

- “Out-of-bailiwick” → “out-domain” delegation

;;NS RR

ab.ca. NS ns.ya.hoo

[No glue records]



Stale Glue Records

■ Abandoned glue records

- When domain owners change their authoritative nameserver's IP
- When the domain is expired or the nameserver is deprecated





■ Finding stale glue records

1. **Glue record IP** does not match the **authoritative nameserver's IP**
 - **Authoritative nameserver's IP** can be found by actively resolving the NS record
2. **Glue record domain** does not provide services for the delegated domains

Stale Glue Records Measurement

- Dataset: ICANN Centralized Zone Data Service (CZDS)
 - Authorized zone files for 1,096 TLDs (e.g., com, net, org, ...)
 - Delegation information for all its associated SLDs
- 2,283,196 glue records found
- 529,197 **stale** glue records (23.18%)
 - Glue record IP (Old) → Current IP migration occurs in cloud platforms



Glue Records Usage of DNS Implementaion

- A typical user (stub resolver) sending recursive queries will never see glue records

- DNS software usage of glue records
 - Does DNS software validate glue records before use?
 - Whether the software caches unvalidated glue records?
 - How does the software handle it when no response is received from the Glue IP?

- DNS resolvers' usage of glue records
 - Public DNS: 14 (1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, 9.9.9.9, ...)
 - Open DNS resolvers: 895,674

Glue Records Usage of DNS Implementaion


- Most DNS software cache and use glue records without validation
- For out-domain delegation, this behavior results in *shadow caching*, which enables domain hijacking and DoS attacks

DNS Software		Active Glue		
brand	version	use directly ¹	check actively ²	shadow caching ³
BIND [13]	9.18.12	✓	✗	✓
PowerDNS Recursor [58]	4.8.4	✓	✗	✓
Unbound [54]	1.17.1	✓	✓	✓
Knot [37]	5.6.0	✓	✗	✓
CoreDNS [19]	1.10.1	✓	✗	✗
Technitium [65]	11.1.1	✓	✓	✗
MaraDNS [49]	3.5.0036	✓	✗	✗
Microsoft DNS [51]	2022	✓	✗	✓
Simple DNS Plus [62]	9.1	✓	✗	✓

Does not cache
out-domain
delegation records

Shadow Caching

- Glue records are only allowed to be used under in-domain or sibling-domain delegation
 - For out-domain delegation, the referral response should not contain glue records
- Mainstream DNS software caches the glue records in the referral response
- By creating sibling-domain delegation, we can inject specific stale glue records into the target resolver in advance → *shadow*



Preparation Phase (1)


- Find stale glue record that matches the victim's NS

;;NS RR

victim.net. NS ns1.vulner.com

➔ Stale glue record found

ns1.vulner.com A (stale IP)



Preparation Phase (2)


- Register attack.com and the following sibling-domain glue record

;;NS RR

attack.com. NS ns1.vulner.com

;;Glue records in .com zone

ns1.vulner.com A (stale IP)




Preparation Phase (3) – (4)

- Query attack.com

➔ Glue record is now cached in the recursive resolver

ns1.vulner.com A (stale IP)




Attack vectors

- If (stale IP) is obtainable
 - E.g., Acquiring and releasing cloud IPs for (stale IP)


➔ Domain hijacking

victim.net. NS ns1.vulner.com ➔ (stale IP)





Attack vectors

- If (stale IP) is not obtainable
→ Denial of Service (DoS)



Exploitable Stale Glue Records Measurement

- 2,283,196 glue records found → 529,197 **stale** glue records
- 193,558 **exploitable stale** glue records
 - 6M domain names, among 5,395 were ranked in Tranco Top 1M
- Acquiring (stale IP)s within two weeks
 - Successfully applied for 27 stale IPs, costing \$2.3 total



Glue Records Usage of DNS Implementaion

■ Public resolvers: 14

- All 14 public DNS resolvers are vulnerable to in-domain and sibling-domain hijacking
- Only 1.1.1.1 (Cloudflare) and 8.8.8.8 (Google) trust the records they resolve actively instead of using glue records under out-domain delegation

■ Open DNS resolvers: 895,674

- Over 90% of resolvers cache and use unvalidated glue records


Mitigations

■ Registrars and Registries

- Registrars comprehensive cleanup of all invalid glue records
- Standardization of proper operations on expired domains

■ Resolver software

- For sibling-domain and out-domain delegations
→ Actively query the IP of the glued nameserver domain



감사합니다
Thank you~!